Growing up in North Carolina, I learned a surprising historical fact. During the Civil War, “Yankee” foundry companies in Connecticut made CSA uniform buttons for the Rebel Army, using British intermediaries to avoid the shipping blockade.
It’s both bizarre and dangerous to rely on your enemy for military supplies, but this practice has again crept into American defense manufacturing in recent decades. Our reflexive dependence on Chinese manufacturing is rapidly emerging as our Achilles heel, and it is setting up our military for failure.
Consider this: America still retains an official policy of defense support for Taiwan, yet we rely on its potential predator, China, for key components of high-tech weapon systems. This problematic practice likely looms much larger. The GAO recently found that the Federal Procurement Data System database, through which the Pentagon documents more than 200,000 military suppliers, “provides limited information about the countries of origin” for its military supply components.
The GAO points out that the same troubling practice China utilizes in private commerce is also employed in this most crucial public endeavor: “These suppliers may cut off US access to critical materials or provide ‘back doors’ in their technology that serve as intelligence pathways.”
Those recent reports reaffirm my opposition to special trade status for China, which I voted against two decades ago in Congress.
“Globalism Gurus” and so-called “free trade” brought us to this dangerous juncture. During the first decade of this century, our nation lost more than 5.7 million manufacturing jobs, or one-third of our factory workforce. Many of those workers supported our defense industries. Some observers equate it to an aerial bombing assault on our manufacturing facilities.
Add overregulation, skilled workforce issues, “environmental” initiatives to curtail domestic mining for rare earth minerals, and America’s state of military readiness is now heavily compromised. Unsurprisingly, it’s starting to show. Just last year, China placed export restrictions on two critical—and “natural” materials: the minerals gallium and germanium, which GAO notes are “critical for military-grade electronics.”
Fortunately, our self-inflicted missteps of the past have prompted the Trump administration to bolster our own domestic defense production by bringing our supply chain back to America’s shores.
This supply chain transition can’t happen soon enough. A recent report showed that civil and defense aviation saw soaring demand in 2024, but production continues to lag due to labor shortages and persistent supply chain vulnerabilities. This spells delivery delays and other troubles for key military assets, like our F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which is essential to our aerial fighting capabilities.
But “onshoring” our military supplies and manufacturing is not enough. We must invest in new technologies to stay ahead. The technology gap between the U.S. and our most powerful adversary, China, is closing. While we spend time and money fixing our compromised supply chain, China is forging ahead with new technologies that put the People’s Liberation Army Air Force on the same footing as America’s warplanes in air-to-air combat operations in the Indo-Pacific theater.
After years of failures, China has quickly gained ground in its next-generation jet propulsion technologies by investing billions into its indigenous WS-10 jet engine program. China is gaining ground so quickly that U.S. intelligence and defense forecasters warn the PRC could present major operational threats as early as 2027.
Engines directly impact a fighter’s ability to engage and defeat an enemy with superior speed, range, altitude, and maneuverability. When your enemy’s engine capabilities are similar, your chances of winning a dogfight significantly decrease.
That’s why we must counter the WS-10 program by investing more today in the U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion (NGAP) program, which aims to develop advanced jet engines that will enable more fuel efficiency, increased thrust, and other characteristics that will ensure our air dominance well into the future.
The good news is that the development of such an advanced engine is already underway. The bad news is that funding for this new engine is severely lacking. Earlier this year, the U.S. Air Force called for $440 million to fund the NGAP program for FY2026, but the administration proposed to underfund the program by nearly $110 million. This gap in funding should be filled; it could significantly widen our technology lead with our greatest adversary. To me, that’s money well spent.
Defense readiness is a balance involving many counterweights, and technology and manufacturing are two of the heaviest. If we want a comfortable lead in air superiority, we must restore and rely on both.