The thick fog of war is rolling over the entire Middle East. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, the picture has been changing on a daily basis, with the pace of events picking up since Israel’s attack on Hezbollah began in earnest in September 2024, finally forcing an end to the Iranian proxy’s more than a year-long shelling of Israel’s north from Lebanon. The most recent development is the spectacular collapse of the Assad regime and the takeover of Damascus by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which evolved out of the al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrah. As President Trump confronts this greatly destabilized and dangerous landscape, President Macron may want to put his country on Trump’s short list of potential partners. However, enlisting Paris’s cooperation in the Levant could prove more of a burden to Washington.
France has a tradition of often intervening in the affairs of its former colonies and protectorates. Its connection with Lebanon goes back to ties with the country’s (now very diminished) Maronite Christian community beginning with the Crusades. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations formally made Lebanon a French Mandate in 1923, a relationship that continued until its formal independence in 1943. France also controlled Syria from 1919 until 1945, repeatedly putting down Muslim and Druze-Arab rebellions.
In Africa, France was extremely exploitative in the Sahel, a belt of impoverished but natural resources-rich countries stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and plagued by Islamist terrorists. France failed to provide effective security against the jihadis or pay fair market prices for the extracted natural resources and lost its hold to Russia’s mercenary Wagner Group. This was a setback for the West as a whole because it opened the door to Russian and Chinese entrenchment in the region.
Macron grandstanded on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, raising the possibility of NATO troops getting involved in March 2024, heightening concerns of escalation into World War III. France now wants to work with America in the Middle East. The Macron-Trump meeting at Notre Dame’s rededication allowed Macron to pitch his Levant ideas. Still, his interest in maintaining France’s status as a major player may only complicate matters for the U.S. Macron's domestic challenges, including the December 4th no-confidence vote and a budget deficit of 6.1 percent of GDP, further weakens his position.
Macron now must appoint a new prime minister and form a government capable of bridging the parliamentary divide and securing approval for next year’s budget under circumstances where his credibility at home is markedly low. Meanwhile, his efforts to entangle France in Lebanon may fail.
To gain a foothold in Lebanon, Macron and his government performed a bait-and-switch tactic using the controversial arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) on November 21, 2024, charging Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant with "war crimes" in Gaza.
These warrants obligate the 123 ICC member states to detain them if they enter their territory. European reactions were mixed, with Hungary the only European country to openly challenge the warrants. On November 26, the then-French Prime Minister Barnier promised that “France will, as always, adhere to its international legal obligations in this matter, just as in others.” President of the French National Assembly Braun-Pivet, said that as a signatory to the ICC statute, France “must follow the rules” and arrest Netanyahu if he set foot on French soil.
However, by November 27, France had agreed to soften its position on the arrest warrants in exchange for a role in enforcing the Lebanon ceasefire agreement announced by President Biden and Macron on November 26th. In an about-face, the French foreign ministry said that Netanyahu would have immunity because Israel is not a signatory to the ICC statute.
Ultimately, then, the ICC arrest warrant became a bargaining chip for France in its efforts to regain influence over Lebanon, its former colony. It appears that France strategically muscled itself into a role in the cease-fire agreement on Lebanon, employing pressure tactics that included the threat of an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant against Israeli officials. While other nations adopted firm stances on the ICC arrest warrants, and while France’s former ambassador to Israel and the U.S. took to X to declare that German refusal to comply with the ICC warrant signaled “the collapse of all Western pretensions,” France’s initial declarations about following the rules were merely a facade.
Deals are not new in French foreign policy, especially regarding its former colonies. For example, in 2020, Macron twice visited Lebanon after an explosion in the port of Beirut to meet with leaders (many of whom were tied to or heavily under the influence of Hezbollah, suspected of potential involvement in the blast). The result was a multibillion-dollar contract to rebuild the Beirut port awarded to his ally Rodolphe Saadé, owner of CMA-CGM shipping and BFM TV. In return, France agreed to overlook Hezbollah's activities.
When it comes to the Levant, France is compromised by its colonial legacy and continues its transactional policies. The Trump administration should be fully aware of the nature of “offers of help” from Paris.